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In a practical continuous-variable quantum-key distribution (CVQKD), the fluctuations of the
local oscillator (LO) not only make the normalization of Bob’s measurement outcomes difficult,
but also can change the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of an imperfect balanced homodyne detector
(BHD), which may lead the security of a practical system of CVQKD to be compromised severely.
In this paper, we propose that the LO intensity can be manipulated by the legitimate parties, i.e.,
being tuned and stabilized to a required constant value, to eliminate the impact of LO fluctuations
and defeat Eve’s potential attack on the LO. Moreover, we show that the secret key rate can be
increased over a noisy channel, especially the channels of metropolitan QKD networks, by tuning
the intensity of LO and thus the SNR of a practical BHD to an optimal value, and we find that,
counterintuitively, the requirement on BHD (i.e., high detection efficiency and low electronic noise)
can also be reduced in this case. To realize this manipulation, we give a schematic setup which thus
can be used to enhance the security of a practical CVQKD system.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.Cf
Introduction.— Continuous-variable quantum-key dis-
tribution (CVQKD), which exploits two beams [the sig-
nal beam carrying the encoding information and the lo-
cal oscillator (LO) as a phase reference of the signal state
used for balanced homodyne detection] to distribute se-
cret keys between two legitimate parties (Alice and Bob),
has received great developments in the past decade [1].
Since the Grosshans-Grangier protocol (GG02 protocol)
[2] was first proposed in 2002, various experimental im-
plementations of CVQKD have been carried out by a few
groups [3–11], which makes the CVQKD more promising
and practical.
Currently, the security of CVQKD has been demon-
strated theoretically [12–16], but the practical system’s
security is still the focus of research, such as the analysis
of imperfections and the discovery of loopholes of prac-
tical systems [17–24]. In Refs. [17, 18], LO was pointed
out to be a vulnerability for the practical system, since
it is under Eve’s control. Furthermore, in Ref. [23], we
showed that LO intensity fluctuations open a loophole for
Eve and small fluctuations could compromise the security
of the practical CVQKD system severely. Therefore, we
point out that LO should be monitored accurately and
Bob’s measurements should be scaled with the instan-
taneous intensity value of each pulse of LO. However,
scaling each pulse’s measurement with the instantaneous
value makes Bob’s measuring complicated. Besides, the
analysis in Ref. [23] was carried out with a perfect bal-
anced homodyne detector (BHD), however, for a non-
ideal BHD, Eve still could intercept partial secret keys
as analyzed in the rest of this paper if Bob takes the
instantaneous normalization.
∗ nmliang@nudt.edu.cn
In this paper, to guarantee the security of the prac-
tical system, we propose an alternative countermeasure
to solve this problem; i.e., Bob actively stabilizes LO to
defeat Eve’s LO intensity attack (LOIA, see details in
Ref. [23]). Furthermore, based on this countermeasure,
we point out that the LO could be manipulated not only
by Eve to attack the system, but also by Bob in turn to
increase the secret key rate over a noisy channel, due to
the fact that the variation of LO can change the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of a practical BHD [25]. Our nu-
merical simulation shows that this manipulation of LO
can improve the resistance of a practical system to the
channel excess noise and may reduce the requirement on
BHD (i.e., high detection efficiency and low electronic
noise), just by Bob tuning and stabilizing LO intensity
to a required optimal constant value. Before describing
this countermeasure, we first analyze the effect of LOIA
on a practical imperfect BHD of Bob.
Nonideal BHD attack.— In realistic experiments, the
nonideal BHD of Bob is characterized by the detection ef-
ficiency η and the electronic noise Nel. Electronic noise is
considered as trust noise (the so-called realistic model [5])
that Eve cannot exploit to acquire information, and its
value is calibrated before key distribution based on mea-
suring the variance of BHD when no beams are present.
Hence, when the LO intensity fluctuates during the key
distribution, this variance after being scaled with the LO
instantaneous intensity value (thus called the normalized
electronic-noise varianceNel) will vary certainly, and thus
the SNR of BHD [25].
Specifically, for an ideal BHD, the output of its mea-
surement is [22, 26]
xˆθ ≈ |αLO|(xˆ cos θ + pˆ sin θ), (1)
where αLO is the amplitude of LO, θ is the relative phase
between the signal and LO, and xˆ, pˆ are the quadra-
2tures of the signal state. The rotated quadrature qˆθ =
xˆ cos θ + pˆ sin θ can be measured with different θ. Equa-
tion (1) characterizes a perfect BHD with unity detec-
tion efficiency, negligible losses, perfect balancing, and
the ideal mode compatibility between the signal and LO.
However, for a nonideal BHD, the measured result reads
[27]
xˆθ ≈ |√ηαLO|(√ηqˆθ +
√
1− ηxˆN ) + xˆel. (2)
Here η is the detection efficiency, thus 1 − η represents
the total optical loss, xˆN represents the quadrature of
the vacuum mode, xˆel represents the detection noise of
BHD and mainly indicates the electronic noise when LO
is sufficiently bright (typically 109 photons per pulse).
From Eq. (2), we can see that when the output of BHD
is scaled with |√ηαLO| [28] and made statistics with a suf-
ficient number of pulses, the variance of electronic noise
can be described as Nel = 〈xˆ2el/(η|αLO|2)〉. If the LO
intensity |αLO|2 is a constant, the electronic noise can
be calibrated as a confirmative constant during the cali-
bration procedure. However, when LO fluctuates in time
during the key distribution and we scale Bob’s measure-
ment with the LO instantaneous intensity value of each
pulse (proposed in Ref. [23]) instead of the initial cali-
brated value, the electronic noise will vary, and especially
will decrease when |αLO|2 becomes large. Note that, in
this case, we cannot compute the exact value of Nel be-
cause, on one hand, we do not know the value of xˆel in
Eq. (2) during key distribution, and on the other, hand
the probability distribution of |αLO|2 as a random vari-
able is also unknown or unfixed since LO intensity fluc-
tuations are under Eve’s control and she can manipulate
them arbitrarily.
In the realistic model, the electronic noise is consid-
ered as trust noise [5], and its small variations have lit-
tle impact on the secret key rate of Alice and Bob as
shown in Fig. 1(a). However, when the electronic noise
varies, especially becomes small, Bob will underestimate
the channel excess noise, since he cannot know exactly
the electronic noise value when he uses the LO instanta-
neous intensity value to scale his measurements for each
pulse. In addition, this will make the secret key rate com-
promised as shown in Fig. 1(b); i.e., when the electronic
noise decreases, Bob will overestimate his secret key rate
if he still uses the initial electronic noise to calculate the
key rate with the realistic model.
Figure 1(b) describes the cases that channel excess
noise is too high while the real electronic noise decreases
drastically, so the secret key rate is compromised severely
if the initial calibrated normalized electronic noise is still
used in the calculation. Additionally, if Bob classifies his
measurements by different values of |αLO|2 during the pa-
rameter estimation procedure, and estimates an average
value of normalized electronic noise using the statistic
distribution of |αLO|2, he still cannot estimate the exact
secure rates using the realistic model. This is because
the mean value of electronic noise is not the real one (cf.
the expression of Nel) and the statistic probability distri-
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FIG. 1. (Color online) (a) Secret key rate vs channel losses
(dB) with the electronic noise decreasing, i.e., Nel = 0.041
(solid line), 0.0359 (dashed line), 0.0205 (dotted line), for a
fixed channel excess noise ε = 0.2 (in shot-noise units). The
three curves almost overlapping indicates that the variations
of the electronic noise as a trust noise have little impact on
the key rate. (b) Truly secret key rate with the case that
the decrease of the electronic noise hides the channel excess
noise. Solid line indicates (ε,Nel) is (0.2, 0.041), dashed line
[0.2+0.041/(8ηT ), 0.0359] and dotted line [0.2+0.041/(2ηT ),
0.0205] where T is the channel transmission, provided that the
total noise refereed to the channel input, χT =
1−ηT
ηT
+ε+Nel
ηT
,
keeps constant. Bob has no idea about the real electronic
noise when LO fluctuates, so if he still considers ε = 0.2, Nel =
0.041 in the above three cases, he will overestimate his key
rates in the later two cases (see text for further details). The
curves are plotted for Alice’s mode variance V = 40 (in shot-
noise units) with BHD parameters selected as in Ref. [5] (i.e.,
η = 0.606, Nel = 0.041).
bution of |αLO|2 in the parameter estimation procedure
cannot represent the one in the key extraction procedure
since it can be arbitrary as mentioned earlier. In this
sense, Eve still could fool Alice and Bob by the appro-
priate manipulation of the intensity of LO.
In practical experiments, however, the fluctuation of
LO is small and channel excess noise is also very small.
Hence, the electronic noise also varies a bit and has little
impact on the key rate. However, in this case, we have to
discard pulses with large fluctuation of LO since this large
fluctuation will largely change the SNR of a practical
BHD. Nevertheless, this will decrease the efficiency of
key distribution. Note that the channel excess noise is
under Eve’s control, so if Eve implements this nonideal
BHD attack, LO fluctuations still open a loophole.
Countermeasure.— However, if we can stabilize the in-
tensity of LO as a constant before the homodyne detec-
tion, the above problem will be solved automatically and
Eve’s attack proposed in Ref. [23] will also be avoided
efficiently. Figure 2 gives a schematic setup to stabilize
the intensity of each pulse of LO, which consists of mon-
itoring LO by splitting a small part with an asymmetric
splitter and amplifying or attenuating the LO intensity
based on the monitoring value. For the purpose of a rel-
atively simple implementation, for example, we can use
a beam splitter, whose transmission is variable, to tune
the LO intensity and stabilize it to a required constant
value.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Schematic setup for stabilizing the
intensity of LO. It consists of monitoring each pulse’s inten-
sity by splitting a small part of it and using an amplifier
or attenuator to amplify or attenuate each pulse which thus
stabilizes each pulse’s intensity identical with the initial cal-
ibrated value. PBS: polarization beam splitter; PM: phase
modulator for selecting xˆ or pˆ quadrature measurement; BS:
beam splitter; A: amplifier or attenuator; PD: photodetector.
Dashed-line diagram describes the schematic intensity-tuning
and stabilizing system.
Before the homodyne detection, if each pulse’s inten-
sity of LO is identical with the calibrated value or fluctu-
ates in an extremely small range, the security of the prac-
tical system can be guaranteed and Eve’s attack on LO
can be avoided. Additionally, with the proposed setup we
can tune the LO intensity to an any permitted constant
value, thus the SNR (shot-noise to electronic noise ratio)
of BHD can be changed to a desired value, which will
bring out some merits for CVQKD over a noisy channel.
Increase secret keys.— As shown in the previous sec-
tion, tuning the intensity of LO changes the SNR of a
practical BHD [25], which may improve the tolerance of
a practical system to channel excess noise. We begin
this analysis by first pointing out that adding some noise,
classical or quantum, to the reference partner of reconcil-
iation can increase the secret key rate over a noisy chan-
nel regardless of the discrete or continuous variable QKD
protocol [29–34]. Particularly, in Ref. [32], Garc´ıa-Patro´n
and Cerf proposed a new protocol based on squeezed
states and heterodyne detection, which is equivalent to
the protocol based on squeezed states and homodyne de-
tection but adding some noise on Bob. This additional
noise, as a trust noise which is not induced by Eve, makes
the protocol more robust against the channel excess noise
because it is more detrimental to Eve than to Bob. As
pointed out in Ref. [32], there is an optimal added noise
on the data of the reference partner of reconciliation for
a fixed channel excess noise based on squeezed states and
homodyne detection; we show that the same is also true
of the protocol with coherent states and homodyne de-
tection (see details in Appendix A).
Hence, in the practical coherent state CVQKD imple-
mentation over a noisy channel, we can add some Gaus-
sian noise to Bob’s homodyne detection to increase the
secret key rate. Over this added noise, the noisy ho-
modyne protocol incredibly improves the resistance to
channel excess noise as shown in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Tolerable excess noise ε (in shot-noise
units) vs channel losses (in dB) for reverse reconciliation pro-
tocol: coherent states and noisy homodyne protocol (solid
line), coherent states and perfect homodyne protocol (dashed
line), coherent states and heterodyne protocol (dotted line),
and squeezed states and noisy homodyne protocol [32] for
a comparison (dot-dashed line). The curves are plotted for
V = 40.
With the optimal added noise χD for a fixed chan-
nel excess noise, we plot the secret key rates of differ-
ent coherent state protocols in Fig. 4(a), and find that
the noisy homodyne protocol gives a higher secret key
rate than the perfect homodyne or heterodyne protocol
for higher channel losses or longer transmission distances
than a given threshold. The calculation of key rates can
be obtained using the standard method [5, 32, 35, 36]
(see Appendix B for details).
We also plot the added optimal Gaussian noise [solid
line in Fig. 4(b)], which can be realized with three meth-
ods (see details in Appendix A), as a function of channel
losses for a fixed channel excess noise ε = 0.25. Par-
ticularly, we plot the corresponding electronic noise of a
practical BHD [dashed line in Fig. 4(b)] for a fixed detec-
tion efficiency η = 0.606 (selected as Ref. [5]) to realize
the case of adding optimal Gaussian noise. It is coun-
terintuitive that, for higher channel losses than a given
threshold, electronic noise can be beneficial for increasing
the secret key rate in CVQKD with the reverse reconcili-
ation (RR) protocol over a noisy channel. As the authors
of Ref. [32] proposed, instead of using a random number
generator to generate the noise χD, Bob can do it phys-
ically by tuning the efficiency of his detector. However,
Bob can also realize it by tuning the electronic noise in
some limited range, or simultaneously tuning the effi-
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a) Secret key rate vs channel losses
(dB) with a fixed channel excess noise ε = 0.25 for re-
verse reconciliation protocol, i.e., coherent states and opti-
mal noisy homodyne protocol (solid line), coherent states
and perfect homodyne protocol (dashed line), and coherent
states and heterodyne protocol (dotted line). (b) Optimal
added noise χD on Bob’s data vs channel losses (dB) on the
left vertical axis (solid line), and dashed line corresponds to
the optimal electronic noise. On the right vertical axis, the
bold dotted line describes the gain of LO intensity corre-
sponding to the optimal electronic noise (dashed line) ac-
cording to Nel = 〈xˆ
2
el〉/(ηG|αLO|
2) with η = 0.606. The
black circle dot pointed at by an arrow indicates that when
Nel = 0.041, G = 1.
ciency and the electronic noise to match the added noise
χD.
As previous sections analyzed, we can change the SNR
or the normalized electronic noise of BHD by tuning the
LO intensity. In Fig. 4(b), we plot the gain G of LO cor-
responding to the optimal electronic noise on the right
vertical axis (see bold dotted line) and select G = 1 when
the electronic noise is 0.041 (black circle dot). However,
for the higher intensity of LO, the BHD will saturate and
thus cannot work, but decreasing less than one order of
electronic noise (i.e., Nel ≥ 0.0041, G ≤ 10) may be still
realistic in the current setup [5, 6, 18]. Note that, in this
case, we must be very careful since Eve may implement
a saturation attack [37] on the practical BHD. Hence, we
must monitor the mean of Bob’s data carefully to avoid
this attack (see details in Ref. [37]). In this sense, the
improved performance by tuning LO intensity to higher
intensity may be limited in this region. By contrast, for
the lower intensity of LO, the noise of BHD may be higher
than what Fig. 4(b) shows, because there are other excess
noises not controlled by Eve, except the electronic noise
in the BHD; i.e., the SNR of BHD is not linear depen-
dent on the intensity of LO when LO is not strong and
the other excess noise can be still taken as a trust noise.
Consequently, with the setup of Fig. 2, we can always
tune the intensity of LO in the calibration procedure to
get the optimal trust added noise supplied by BHD to im-
prove the performance of a practical system over a noisy
and lossy channel, and stabilize it on a constant value
to avoid Eve’s attack on LO during the key distribution.
Although this tuning or improvement may be limited, it
is still worth testing in practical experiments.
Discussion and open problem.— In the previous sec-
tions we have described a schematic setup that can tune
the intensity of each pulse of LO to a desired value thus
stabilize LO. If we can amplify the intensity of each pulse
without changing its phase, the intensity of LO sent by
Alice cannot be so strong, which thus could reduce the
crosstalk between the signal and LO when they are mul-
tiplexed into a same optical fiber. The channel excess
noise induced by this crosstalk can be reduced dramati-
cally, which also improves the performance of a practical
system of CVQKD. Besides, a general amplifier or atten-
uator may introduce some phase-insensitive noise, which
still can be measured and thus regarded as trust noise
to Bob’s data. But in this case, we should carefully se-
lect these components, avoiding that the introduced extra
noise by them exceeds the optimal trust added noise.
Recently, it has been reported that the coherent state
CVQKD system was integrated into cryptographic QKD
networks and passed some field tests, which confirms the
integrability and reliability of it [9, 10]. For a field imple-
mentation, the channel excess noise is much higher than
that of the experimental test and LO also fluctuates dra-
matically for a long transmission distance. Hence, our
proposed stabilization system may be useful and prac-
tical for this case, especially for the metropolitan QKD
network. Moreover, since the electronic noise may be
beneficial for the CVQKD RR protocol over a noisy chan-
nel, the requirement on a practical BHD (high efficiency
and low electronic noise) can be reduced for high channel
excess noise, and in this circumstance the SNR of BHD
is not necessarily much higher, which means that the
LO intensity can be much lower than the typical value
109 photons per pulse. In other words, we only need
to let the SNR (here the noise includes the equivalent
noise induced by the detection efficiency) of a practical
BHD match the channel excess noise for the RR protocol.
It can be realized just by tuning the detection efficiency
and LO intensity as the above analyzed for a given BHD,
though its performance may be limited for low channel
excess noise.
However, we point out that there still exist two open
problems to be discussed. First, the above schematic
setup needs to be verified experimentally with current
facilities and technologies, however, stabilizing each pulse
to a constant level may be a big challenge, so seeking good
methods will be an interesting and useful target. Second,
since the electronic noise may be beneficial for increasing
the secret key rate over a noisy channel, it will be very
interesting whether the measurement of this BHD is valid
or accessible when the normalized electronic noise is close
to or even higher than the shot-noise level [as shown in
Fig. 4(b)], which still needs the experimental verification.
Conclusion.— We analyzed the effect of the LO fluc-
tuation on a practical imperfect BHD in details, and find
that LO fluctuation can affect the SNR of BHD, which
cannot be measured and is thus unknown to Bob. This
could compromise the security of a practical system of
CVQKD. Hence, Bob needs to scale his measurements
5with the instantaneous LO intensity value when LO fluc-
tuates in a extremely small range and select the smallest
electronic noise of BHD in this range as the trust noise
to calculate the secret key rate. So pulses with a large
fluctuation of LO still need to be discarded due to its
big change on the SNR of BHD, which thus reduces the
efficiency of key distribution. However, we proposed a
schematic stabilization system to stabilize the intensity
of LO, which could solve this problem and avoid Eve’s
attack on LO. Then, we studied the impact of Gaussian
phase-insensitive noise on the secret key rate for a practi-
cal CVQKD system with an RR coherent state protocol,
and showed that tuning the LO intensity thus changing
the SNR of BHD could increase the secret key rate over
a noisy channel. Hence, we can enhance the security of
a practical CVQKD system, especially the system inte-
grated into the QKD metropolitan networks, which has
high channel excess noise and dramatic LO fluctuation,
just by the manipulation of LO, i.e., tuning and stabiliz-
ing the intensity of LO.
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Appendix A: Noisy coherent states protocol
In this Appendix, we detail the description about the
entanglement-based (EB) scheme of a noisy coherent-
state protocol of CVQKD for RR, which is analogous
to the protocol based on squeezed states and noisy ho-
modyne detection.
The protocol with coherent states and homodyne de-
tection is shown in Fig. 5. Generally, it is used to equiv-
alently describe the practical prepare-and-measure (PM)
implementation of CVQKD with a nonideal balanced ho-
modyne detector (BHD) [5, 6]. However, it also can be
used to describe the EB scheme of a noisy detection pro-
tocol with the coherent states proposed in the main text.
As shown in Ref. [32], the added Gaussian phase-
insensitive noise can be modeled by the three physi-
cal cases: (i) nonideal homodyne detection with effi-
ciency η and electronic noise Nel = (1 − η)(N − 1) (see
Refs. [5, 6]); (ii) perfect homodyne detection followed by
adding some classical or quantum Gaussian noise of vari-
ance χD = (1− η)N/η [35]; and (iii) any combination of
the previous cases giving the same χD. Over this added
noise, the noisy homodyne protocol incredibly improves
V (T,   )
N
vacuum EPR
EPR channel
xB
pA
xA
G
F
F0
Alice Bob
 A B0 BTA B1
FIG. 5. (Color online) EB scheme based on coherent states
and homodyne detection protocol with added noise on Bob’s
side for RR over a lossy and noisy channel (transmission T and
excess noise ε). Alice makes a heterodyne detection on one
half of an EPR state whose variance is V with a 50:50 beam
splitter (TA = 1/2), and Bob applies a homodyne detection
on the other half. Before Bob’s homodyne detection, another
EPR state of variance N , whose one mode is mixed with the
signal by a beam splitter (transmittance η), models the added
Gaussian noise.
the resistance to channel excess noise as shown in Fig. 3
of the main text.
Appendix B: Calculation of the secret key rate
In this Appendix, we calculate the secret key rate of
Gaussian modulation coherent states CVQKD with ho-
modyne detection, heterodyne detection, and noisy ho-
modyne detection protocol, respectively, for RR (see de-
tails in Refs. [5, 6, 32, 35, 36]). For these three cases, the
secret key rate can be written by
KRR = βIAB − χBE . (B1)
Here IAB is the mutual information between Alice and
Bob, χBE is the Holevo bound between Eve and Bob,
and β is the reconciliation efficiency. We select β = 1 in
the numerical simulation of this paper for simplicity.
For homodyne detection, Alice and Bob’s mutual in-
formation is given by
IAB =
1
2
log2
VB
VB|A
=
1
2
log2
V + χC
1 + χC
, (B2)
where VB = T (V + χC) and VB|A = T (1 + χC) are
Bob’s variance and the conditional variance of quadra-
ture measurements, respectively. χC = (1 − T )/T + ε is
the total channel added noise referred to the channel in-
put with T, ε respective channel transmission and excess
noise shown in Fig. 5. The Holevo bound χBE is given
by
χBE = S(E)− S(E|B), (B3)
where S(E) = S(AB) can be calculated with the covari-
ance matrix γAB in the EB scheme (see Fig. 5), which is
given by
γAB =
(
aI cσZ
cσZ bI
)
, (B4)
6where I and σZ are the Pauli matrices and a = V, b =
T (V +χC), and c =
√
T (V 2 − 1) with V the variance of
Alice’s mode or the EPR state in Fig. 5. Therefore, we
have
S(AB) = G
(
λ1 − 1
2
)
+G
(
λ2 − 1
2
)
. (B5)
Here G(x) = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− x log2 x, and the sym-
plectic eigenvalues of γAB are given by
λ1,2 =
√
∆∓√∆2 − 4D2
2
, (B6)
where ∆ = a2 + b2 − 2c2 and D = ab − c2. Similarly,
S(E|B) = S(A|B) for homodyne detection can be calcu-
lated with the covariance matrix γxBA = diag(a− c2/b, a),
where diag(, ) denotes the diagonal matrix with the ar-
guments on the diagonal elements and zeros elsewhere.
Hence, S(A|B) = G[(λ3−1)/2] with the symplectic eigen-
value λ3 =
√
a(a− c2/b).
For heterodyne detection, IAB is given by
IAB = log2
VB + 1
VB|A + 1
= log2
T (V + χC) + 1
T (1 + χC) + 1
, (B7)
The Holevo bound is also given by Eq. (B3) and S(E) =
S(AB) has been obtained by Eq. (B5). S(E|B) =
S(A|xB , pB) can be calculated with the covariance ma-
trix γxB,pBA = diag[a − c2/(b + 1), a − c2/(b + 1)]; ie.,
S(A|xB , pB) = G[(λ4 − 1)/2] with the symplectic eigen-
value λ4 = a− c2/(b+ 1).
Finally, for noisy homodyne detection, Alice and Bob’s
mutual information IAB is given by
IAB =
1
2
log2
ηVB + (1− η)N
ηVB|A + (1− η)N
=
1
2
log2
V + χT
1 + χT
,
(B8)
where χT = χC + χD/T , and χD = (1 − η)N/η =
(1−η)/η+Nel/η is the added Gaussian noise. The Holevo
bound χBE is still given by Eq.(B3) with the unclear
term S(E|B), which is given by S(E|B) = S(AFG|B) =
G[(λ5− 1)/2]+G[(λ6− 1)/2], with the symplectic eigen-
values
λ5,6 =
√
A∓√A2 − 4B
2
, (B9)
where A = 1
b+χD
[b+aD+χD∆] and B =
D
b+χD
[a+χDD]
(see details in Refs. [32, 35]).
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